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Organizational blind spots: splitting, blame and idealization in the National Health 
Service 
Marianna Fotaki and Paula Hyde 
 
Abstract  
The paper examines the escalation of commitment to failing strategies from a psychodynamic 
perspective as an affective process connecting organizational, systemic and individual levels. 
We propose a theory of organizational blind spots to explain how such escalation of 
commitment occurs. Blind spots develop an organizational defence mechanism for coping 
with problems resulting from attempts to implement unrealistic strategy or policy goals. 
Unrealistic strategic aims mobilize and reinforce blind spots through processes of splitting, 
blame and idealization, thus enabling organizations to persist with unsuccessful courses of 
action. Organizational blind spots arise when leadership and/or operational members in 
organizations are unable to acknowledge unworkable strategies. Vignettes from the National 
Health Service in England (the NHS) are used to illustrate how blind spots sustain an illusory 
possibility of success while commitment to a failing strategy escalates. The theory of blind 
spots offers a novel social-psychological approach to understanding how these dysfunctions 
of strategy develop and become institutionalized, putting organizations in jeopardy and 
threatening their survival.  
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
When decision-makers commit to failing strategies, the impact is far reaching, affecting 
customers, employees, taxpayers and/or citizens (Staw, 1981; Brockner, 1992; Bazerman & 
Neal, 1992; Keil et al., 2000). Various theoretical frames have been used to explain these 
phenomena including expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), self-justification (Brockner, 1992), 
risk-taking (Keil et al., 2000) and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). These 
theories advance two broad types of explanation: (a) the minimization of risk through 
perception bias and (b) the psychological inability of actors to accept previously incurred 
losses. While such approaches offer important insights into the mechanisms and dynamics of 
the emergence of escalation of commitment, questions remain as to why rational individuals 
continue to invest their time and energy in pursuing unsuccessful strategies. Mainstream 
economics acknowledges people may not act in accordance with their objective needs or 
behave rationally (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Equally, the importance of affect in decision-
making leading to the build-up of the escalation spiral has also been recognized (e.g. Wong & 
Kwong, 2007). However, there is a dearth of research into social and structural determinants 
of escalation of commitment (Ross & Staw, 1993; Sleesman et al., 2012:557).  
 
In response, we draw on a body of work concerned with social defences against anxiety to 
elaborate further the phenomenon of escalation of commitment. We develop the concept of 
“organizational blind spots” to describe how defence mechanisms enable organizations to 
remain committed to unworkable strategies, arguing that the formation of blind spots is a 
result of a dual process. First, we suggest that blind spots are fueled by unrealistic policies 
emerging in response to unconscious social demands, such as the expectation that health 
systems, when run properly, can prevent disease and dying (Obhlozer, 1994). Second, we 
suggest that blind spots are enabled by defence mechanisms (splitting, blame and 
idealization), that play a role in maintaining commitment to unsuccessful strategies. Three 
cases from the National Health Service (NHS) in England provide exemplars of the dynamics 
that lead to the development and institutionalization of blind spots.  
 
Thus our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we indicate the potential for a 
psychoanalytic lens to deepen understanding of commitment to failing strategies in 
organizations by highlighting the dynamic interplay between affect, cognition and 
unconscious motivation. The second contribution builds on Menzies (1960) work on social 
defences to describe the evolution and maintenance of organizational blind spots through 
interactions of individual defences with organizational and social contexts. The third and 
final contribution is the extension of the literature by linking escalation of commitment 
phenomena to individual and organizational dynamics and systemic policy.  
 
To develop our argument we, first, briefly review existing work on escalation of 
commitment. These ideas are then examined through a psychodynamic lens to elucidate the 
evolution of organizational blind spots. Three constituent processes of splitting, blame and 
idealization are identified as mechanisms enabling escalation of commitment. We illustrate 
how these defences allow for splits between strategy (policy) and operations 
(implementation) to occur, thus distancing decision-makers from the results of their decisions 
and permitting them to blame operational members for any failures. Subsequent sections 
present examples from health service and health policy, illustrating the development and 
institutionalization of organizational blind spots through these defensive mechanisms. In 
conclusion, we discuss how organizations might protect themselves from the pitfalls of 
escalation.  
 
Committed to failure 
Organizational research offers many accounts of why organizations remain committed to 
failing strategies (Staw & Ross, 1986; Brockner, 1992; Ross & Staw, 1993; Staw et al., 1997; 
Lunenburg, 2010; Sinha et al., 2012). Pioneering work by Barry Staw demonstrates people 
escalate commitment to failing strategies in spite of the ‘objective facts of the situation’ in the 
hope of recouping previous losses (Staw, 1981:584). Staw describes a cycle of escalating 
commitment that is produced as more resources are used in the hope of recouping previous 
losses. He also argues escalation of commitment depends, to some extent, upon who is 
blamed for previous losses with escalation decisions based at least in part on the actors’ 
perceived personal responsibility for losses and political vulnerability. Related studies also 
argue that there are less than rational motivations to continue investing in a project beyond 
any possibility of recuperating the incurred costs (e.g. Brazerman & Neal, 2000).  
 
Various other explanations point at influential factors including: problem framing (Whyte, 
1986), self-justification (Brockner, 1992), the illusion of (Staw et al., 1997), and imperative 
to, maintain control (Sinha et al., 2012) or the motivation to reduce future regret under 
escalation situations (Wong & Kwong, 2007). The evaluation of the possibility of an adverse 
outcome and/or the perception of risk is crucial in risk-taking theory, which argues that the 
disutility caused by losses is greater than the utility obtained from equivalent gains 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In self-justification theory, for instance, aversion to accepting 
loss is decisive (Brockner, 1992). It has also been noted that the sunk cost (Keil et al., 2000) 
creates a cognitive bias at a subconscious level, prompting decision makers to take further 
risks. In other words, individuals’ escalation tendencies are a function of negative affect 
suggesting that people seek to escape from the unpleasant emotions associated with 
escalation situations. This is consistent with the predictions derived from the coping 
perspective (Wong et al., 2006). Further, Wong and Kwong (2007) specify that the emotions 
people expect to experience in the future (e.g., anticipated regret) and the events that have 
happened in the past (e.g. responsibility for initiating the previous decision) simultaneously 
influence their decision in escalation situations. However, these ideas frequently refer to 
escalation of commitment at an individual level whilst such processes often occur in 
organizational and wider societal contexts (see Staw & Fox, 1979; Ross & Staw, 1993). For 
instance, as Staw & Fox (1979) show, external justification effects are particularly strong 
among those who are politically vulnerable or whose initial policy choice has met with 
resistance. Further, the binding of decision makers to a course of action is especially strong 
when advocacy is public, explicit, high in volition, and repeated (Salancik, 1977 cited in Ross 
& Staw, 1993). A more recent meta-analysis of 166 empirical articles by Sleesman et al. 
(2012) identified several different factors influencing the decision to escalate commitment to 
a failing course of action, which they categorized as project-related, individual 
(psychological) and structural (social) issues.     
 
Yet despite explicit references to the importance of context in the literature on the escalation 
of commitment (Sleesman et al., 2012), the majority of explanations continue to focus on 
individual rather than organizational or social factors, and on cognitive rather than emotional 
aspects of decision making. To address gaps in the existing research on the escalation of 
commitment, we turn to the disciplines interpreting individual psychological process in a 
social context and take account of the unexplored dimensions of affective attachments to 
failing projects. 
  
 
 
The evolution of organizational blind spots: Splitting, blame and idealization 
Psychoanalysis may offer a valuable method to explore unconscious aspects of escalation of 
commitment which occur as individuals interact with organizational and social structures 
through various psychological mechanisms. Psychoanalytic theories acknowledge individual 
tendencies for self-deception, which originate in the desire to repress undesirable feelings 
and/or realities. Object relations theory (Klein 1952) suggests self-deception processes 
involve projecting the unwanted aspects of self onto other objects/people/groups (Klein, 
1952). Klein’s original concept was based on observations of infants and described defences 
which protected babies from the unpleasant emotions related to vulnerability, including fear 
of abandonment and physical sensations of hunger. While psychological defences are often 
indispensable for survival and can initially reduce anxiety, they are often achieved by 
distorting reality. 
 
Isabel Menzies (1960) built on the concept of the ‘social defence’ against anxiety originally 
developed by Elliot Jacques (1956), to refocus attention from the individual to an 
organizational level. Menzies described socially sustained defence mechanisms occurring in 
response to anxiety evoked by the specific work task - in her case the fear of death 
experienced by nurses and avoidance of proximity to suffering patients. Her theorizing was 
helpful in explaining why organizations develop defences and how these could be deployed 
to reduce work-related anxiety through depersonalization of care, avoidance of responsibility 
and a slavish attention to routines and rituals (Menzies, 1960). Such distortions, for instance 
involving nurses waking up patients so they could be given sleeping pills, were seemingly 
unrelated to the primary task of the organization but were an effect of ‘historical development 
in nursing services through collusive interaction of individuals to project and reify relevant 
elements of their psychic defence systems’ (Menzies, 1960:115). Building on this work, 
Lawrence (1986) extended the idea of primary organizational task as the essential aspect of 
what an organization does, and needs to keep doing if it is going to continue to exist in its 
current form, to include three further aspects that were unrelated to it but often appeared in 
organizations as defensive mechanisms. These comprised the ‘normative’ task, referring to a 
set of publicly stated goals; the ‘existential’ task expressing the beliefs and values of those 
working in the organization and ‘phenomenal’ task, which was usually unconscious having to 
do with deeper psychic needs of the organizational members (Lawrence, 1986:59). While 
these defences may be protective in certain instances offering containment, and providing 
opportunities for group identification (Brown & Starkey, 2000; Petriglieri & Petriglieri, 
2010) they exceed their usefulness when their maintenance becomes the focus for 
organizational work.  
 
The following sub-sections outline the three psychological defence mechanisms of splitting, 
blame and idealization originally derived from Klein and Menzies’ objects relation theory. 
We explain how these mechanisms contribute to the development of organizational blind 
spots, before outlining a theory of the evolution of blind spots in organizations. 
 
Splitting  
The psychological notion of ‘splitting’ refers to a defence that is used by people to cope with 
doubts, conflicting feelings and anxiety. Splitting enables the individual to separate negative 
and positive feelings (Krantz & Gilmore, 1990:189). When splitting occurs, objects are not 
recognized as wholes, but as separate ‘part’ objects, with the ‘good’ part being idealized and 
the ‘bad’ part carrying the potential to cause harm (Klein, 1952). In periods of extreme stress, 
adults may regress to a developmentally earlier state of splitting and projecting bad objects in 
order to temporarily relieve anxiety. The idealization of wholly good objects and blame of 
wholly bad objects associated with splitting, when overused, may enable detachment from 
reality. Although defences aid survival, they also create difficulties because they do not 
resolve the original source of anxiety and further anxiety is generated from fear of attack 
from the ‘bad’ object. When this occurs, splitting results in a spiral of increasing threats and 
reduced capacity to deal with such threats effectively. As a result, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to challenge as any resolution involves the reintegration of unpleasant elements.  
 
Splitting also occurs between emotions and rational aspects of managing change in 
organizations (Vince & Broussine, 1996), and between elements of organizational learning 
which threaten collective identities (Brown & Starkey, 2000). Krantz & Gilmore (1990) 
researched splitting between management and leadership, which involved the simultaneous 
projection of idealized aspects of leadership on true but distant leaders, and the devaluation of 
leadership’s undesirable features by projecting them onto managers who are responsible for 
the day to day operations. These unconscious and socially sanctioned mechanisms can 
become embedded in organizational structures and cultures, obscuring problems and 
interfering with project implementation. This occurs when problems may be too difficult and 
painful to confront and established organizational practices may be too precious to forsake. In 
order to defend against realization, the problems are then projected onto the departments or 
people who are wrongly identified as being problematic. Denial and displacement of 
unworkable strategies leads to the creation of organizational blind spots and the ultimate 
failure of projects or the entire organization.  
 
For example, in the case of the Challenger space shuttle disaster, propulsion engineers felt 
unable to report erosion of the O-ring seals, whilst managers reported that engineers could 
tell them anything. These two disparate and opposing views, held by managers and engineers 
both appeared to be genuinely believed (Gabriel, 1999:2-5). Managers saw engineers as 
overcautious and, rather than carrying a warning, the technicians came to be seen as the 
problem itself (Hirschhorn, 1988). According to the psychodynamic perspective, NASA 
managers needed to protect themselves against the real or perceived threat from the bad 
objects identified as the technicians, and achieved this by unconsciously restricting the means 
through which technicians could communicate with them. The risk of failure for the top 
administration was 1 in 100,000, but the engineers and statisticians estimated it as 1 in 200 to 
1 in 300 (Schwartz, 1990:89). As a result, the technicians found it increasingly difficult to 
raise concerns and each successful launch was taken as evidence by managers against the 
dangers predicted by technicians (Vaughan, 1996) while the organization sought to contain 
the problem.  
 
Blame 
While splitting allows for the generation of blind spots, blame allows the split to be sustained 
and often follows or accompanies splitting. As a result of splitting, certain parts of the 
organization may appear to be made up of difficult members; they are then regarded as 
having always been difficult and are therefore held responsible for their own problems as the 
case of Challenger disaster illustrates. In psychodynamic theory, blame involves projecting 
unwanted parts of the undesirable situation onto other people or things because an external 
conflict is preferable to the consequences of having to engage in self-examination. The act of 
blaming is indispensable for rationalizing failure away by identifying a suitable culprit: either 
an individual or group of individuals or even a menacing bad policy or strategy that threatens 
the organization from the outside. Whilst externalization of bad feelings offers a superficial 
and short lived comfort, it also renders the organization blind to those who might help 
overcome problems. Blame is generally seen as problematic in organizations: it can be 
mistakenly and unconsciously attributed to those who identify organizational problems. As 
Klein (1952) describes, such ‘part objects’ generate bad feelings and pose a threat to the ideal 
state, and, as such, they must be defended against. The escalation of blame is then required to 
maintain its ‘protective’ role in enabling flight from organizational reality and to sustain 
idealization at an individual, organizational and/or systemic level as follows. 
 
Idealization 
Holding ideals is not in itself problematic. Both the ego-ideal (an aspect of self-based on 
internalized values, norms and images especially, those of parents and peers, one admires and 
wishes to emulate, Gabriel, 1999) and the organizational ideal (where desirable attitudes, 
imagined attributes and aspirational wishes of organization are internalized by its members, 
Schwartz, 1987:330), refer to unconscious strivings towards what one is supposed to be. In 
themselves, they are unproblematic directional indicators: in offering vision they provide 
impetus and motivation for action. However, problems arise when an idealized (individual or 
organizational) state is thought to have been achieved because critical reflection and 
questioning then become impossible. Brown & Starkey (2000:106) argue that idealization 
may be necessary for maintaining a sense of organizational identity; but it is nonetheless 
dysfunctional because it militates against rational and realistic organizational decision-
making. Criticism is then believed to arise from the malicious intent of others and needs 
defending against. Such idealization is only superficially comforting as it maintains contact 
with good, albeit unrealistic, feelings whilst bad feelings are externalized.  
 
Certain organizations and their members are especially susceptible to idealization. In these 
instances, idealization shifts to the systemic level as the purposes that institutions embody 
become the object of emotional investment. Hence, in the Challenger case, the scientists 
(engineers) were mistaken for the problem as their concerns were received as malicious 
criticism that required defending against. The ideal that needed to be maintained in the case 
of Challenger was that of the superiority of US science while, in reality, US research 
institutions operated under a regime of acute spending cuts (Hirschhorn, 1988). Large public 
institutions tend towards idealism because they perform particular social functions by 
allowing citizens to project onto them their aspirations (Hoggett, 2006) and unconscious 
desires allied with primitive fears of survival (Obholzer, 1994, Fotaki, 2006). This applies 
equally to systems charged with health care, education and criminal justice (De Board, 1978; 
Illich, 2002). In sum, splitting and blame together support and enable idealization while all 
three mechanisms jointly contribute to the creation of blind spots as is explained below. 
 
Development of a theory of the evolution of organizational blind spots 
We develop the concept of organizational blind spots to explain how individual psychic 
processes of idealization, splitting, and blame contribute to the creation of social defences 
operating at group and organizational levels and how they may be reinforced further by the 
wider social environment and expressed through aspirational policies and unrealistic 
strategies. These mechanisms are, however, invariably sustained and reproduced by 
individuals or groups. Psychoanalytic ideas envisage the possibility that individuals can 
deceive themselves without lying or being disingenuous. Repression allows for the 
prevention of dangerous or unpleasant ideas from reaching consciousness so they become 
restricted to an unconscious part of the mind (Gabriel, 1999:5). This compartmentalization 
may be necessary as the excessive anticipation of negative outcomes may threaten the ability 
for creative action. As was explained above, splitting is the first step in the development of 
organizational blind spots.  
 
The concept of organizational blind spots does not merely refer to a pervasive state of denial 
of reality but is about the institutionalization of such denial through organizational rituals, 
routines and storytelling. In addition, affective mechanisms are often employed to fulfill 
organizational members’ unconscious need to obscure a painful reality that might otherwise 
threaten their ego and/or organizational ideal, as in the example of the Challenger standing in 
for the achievements of US science. According to Lawrence’s terminology, NASA 
emphasized performing its normative and phenomenal tasks at the expense of its primary 
function. This led to the development of a dysfunctional organization in the mind of its 
members (Armstrong, 2005), which was then shared and jointly reproduced, despite some 
individuals or groups in the organization being fully aware of the ensuing negative outcomes. 
Yet, the organization remained blinded to its protective mechanisms by isolating those 
organizational members (e.g. engineers in the case of Challenger or the health care staff in 
the subsequent examples) who drew attention to problems.  
 
In refusing to acknowledge failings, organizational members or groups detach the bad 
feelings stemming from failure and project them into other objects. This allows the 
organization to continue escalating commitment to unworkable strategies. However, when 
reality catches up, the response is either to integrate the alleged ‘doomsayers’ into the process 
of decision making or an even more excessive splitting and apportioning of blame. 
Responsibility (blame) for failure, then, may be transferred externally (onto other 
institutions/policies) and internally (to other parts of the organization). Such defences, 
operating throughout organizational systems offer the potential for increased risks as 
procedures may subsume rational decision-making and systems can then fail to achieve 
desired goals. This can generate a spiral of increasing demand, thus reducing the 
effectiveness of social institutions (Illich, 2002) and causing inefficiencies in organizations 
that implement them. Socially structured defences can ultimately lead to absurdities as the 
need to defend against anxiety supersedes rationality and their usefulness in fulfilling the 
organizational task.  
 
We next discuss three vignettes illustrating the development and institutionalization of 
organizational blind spots in health care organizations, set in one of the largest and most 
admired public service institutions, the National Health Service (NHS) in England.  
 
Organizational blind spots: Three NHS exemplars 
The first two examples are derived from secondary published sources. In the third example, 
we offer a glimpse of an organizational ethnography conducted in a mental health ward. 
These examples cover investment in information technology (IT) development, patient choice 
policy and attempted reforms of mental health care. Each of them focuses specifically on 
blindness to failure through splitting, blame and idealization. While these are separate cases 
they share a number of common features and taken together they provide insight into the 
development and institutionalization of blind spots.   
 
Example 1: National IT programme for the NHS 
The UK government is particularly vulnerable to escalating commitment to health policies as 
it carries responsibility for large-scale investment decisions in the NHS that are expected to 
achieve improvements in health care. Between 1999 and 2001, £214m in central funding was 
allocated to modernizing information technology in the NHS to achieve a nationally 
compatible records system; however, much of the money was diverted to meet more urgent 
needs (Carnell, 2001). In response to this initial failure to secure funds significant further 
investment was identified to develop a national IT system for the NHS. This programme, 
proclaimed to be the biggest investment ever (Brennan, 2005), was rapidly idealized as it 
promised a solution to co-ordination problems in the NHS. The project aimed to connect 
30,000 general practitioners to 330 hospitals and cover the records of tens of millions of 
patients in England
 
(Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales opted out of this IT ‘Spine’ 
project).  
 
This unprecedented investment in a national records system in the NHS was the world’s 
largest civil information technology (IT) project (Brennan, 2005) aiming to electronically 
store patient records into a common user interface that would improve efficiency and patient 
safety (Coiera, 2007). By 2002, planned investment had soared considerably as had the scope 
of the project. New investment was designed to provide an integrated IT system including: 
prescription service, bookings service, and lifelong health records. The plan was to spend 
£6.2bn on designing and providing this system. This figure, by the government’s own 
estimates, rose to £6.8bn by 2006. However, the National Audit Office estimated the total bill 
for the program would run to £12.7bn and could be closer to £20bn if spending on established 
networks was included (National Audit Office, 2006). Media and academic sources sought to 
question the likelihood of success given the widely recognized difficulties of developing 
large scale public information systems (Goldfinch, 2007). In addition, the program was 
criticized, by doctors, on two fronts: that there was secrecy in the tendering process about 
what the program was supposed to deliver; and proposed plans to share records would breach 
medical privacy and other human rights and, therefore, be illegal according to UK law 
(Cross, 2006). Doctors questioned the scope of the project but were largely excluded from 
consultations or evaluations of the project as it became mired in legal controversy and 
continued to lack the support of clinicians. Ability to assess progress of the project was 
complicated by the awarding of contracts for various parts of the IT system to different 
companies so that, for example, when the system allowing patients to choose providers and 
book appointment times through general practitioners, was delivered on time (Department of 
Health, 2004), it could not be properly tested because the care records system on which it 
depended was running late.  
 
There was an escalation of commitment as increased spending was allocated to the project, 
which had achieved few results and for which substantial funds had already been committed. 
While escalation of commitment can occur with any type of project, software projects may be 
particularly susceptible because of the difficulty in assessing nearness to completion of the 
project (Keil et al., 2000). In large IT projects it is groups rather than individuals who may 
yield to escalation of commitment tendencies (Keil et al., 2000), especially if they are 
distanced from the reality of the task at hand. Fundamental issues concerning clinical 
knowledge and consultation, adequate procurement procedures and patients’ anxieties 
concerning data protection were not sufficiently taken into account giving rise to the creation 
of blind spots during implementation of this IT project.  
 
In this instance, the underlying aspiration was for controllability through information 
management and the necessary step towards the creation of blind spots, here, was the push to 
invest in the scheme without consulting or collaborating with clinical staff or learning from 
past failures (Goldfinch, 2007). A crucial factor was that those involved in the program of 
investment were physically split off and isolated from those who implement the system. 
Clinicians who pointed out the magnitude of socio-cultural shift that was required to make 
the project possible (Hendy et al., 2005), and who attempted to raise concerns early (Cross, 
2006), were blamed as diehards for not embracing the much needed change. They were not 
involved in the early planning process, having already been identified as generally resistant to 
changes in national health policy. The operational staff could have readily pointed to the legal 
and technical obstacles to sharing data but there was a separation of professionals into 
evaluative categories as visionaries and doers. The lack of detailed information about what 
the system was supposed to provide offered a blank slate against which policy makers and the 
public could project their aspirations. The absence of critically important information such as 
the legal difficulties of data sharing was partly due to the exclusion of groups that could 
provide it (i.e. the clinicians) and partly due to a failure to question the lack of detail about 
the scope of the project. Attention to either of these points could have allowed for a more 
judicious evaluation of the projects’ future prospects.  
 
The prominence and the political importance of the project meant that any uncertainty around 
it generated discomfort, which in turn stimulated defence mechanisms. The potential for the 
project to solve future health care problems was idealized and there was splitting off of the 
undesirable realities related to the complexity of the task and difficulties of implementation 
by blaming doctors and clinicians for being unhelpful. These expectations by policy makers, 
and their belief in IT were, we suggest, also held by the public and had to do with the idea 
that massive investments in technology could bypass ‘messy’ issues and, for example, deal 
with disease and dying. This allowed for the development of an ever increasing spiral of 
commitment necessary to maintain the idealization, sustained by structural splits between 
policy makers and those who could question the system. The enacted splits between policy 
makers and clinicians meant that the potential of the IT programme could become idealized 
and only came into question during attempts to implement parts of the system. Clinicians, 
were only included in the process once it hit difficulties (Cross, 2006). The project was 
abandoned in 2011 after the National Audit Office cast serious doubt on the wisdom of 
plowing further money into the scheme (Guardian, 2011).  
Example 2: Individualized patient choice and personalized services 
The second case also concerns national policy aimed at providing better health services, 
namely that of giving patients freedom of choice. The UK Government introduced patient 
choice policies to enable NHS patients to participate directly in decisions about time, location 
and the type of treatment they received (Department of Health, 2003). Individual choice was 
presented as a means for achieving diverse public policy objectives, including better quality 
and responsiveness to users’ needs, increased efficiency and more equitable access to health 
services (Milburn, 2003). It was also presented as a ‘good’ in its own right (Le Grand, 2007). 
Ministerial speeches referred to the necessity and inevitability of radical changes:  
 
We live in a consumer age. People demand services tailor made to their individual 
needs. Ours is the informed and inquiring society. People expect choice and demand 
quality (Milburn, 2002).  
 
Whilst elements of the policy displayed inherent contradictions, such as seeking to increase 
both inter-organizational competition and collaboration, choice, at least on the surface, would 
seem more straightforward – those services chosen by the public would survive and develop.  
 
However, to date, choice has not proven to be a particularly successful strategy. As past and 
more recent attempts to re-introduce this policy in the UK have shown, patients do not seem 
strongly attracted to the idea of consumerist market choice in health care (Fotaki, 2006). Thus 
a recent review of choice in public services found that only 35% of patients exercised choice 
of hospitals (Boyle, 2013). What mattered more to patients was obtaining information about 
their treatment (Picker Europe, 2007). Although generally positive about having choices, the 
most important aspects from patients’ points of view concerned their involvement in 
treatments rather than hospitals or providers (Coulter, 2010). In reality, patients were able to 
choose between hospitals and appointment times rather than primary doctors, hospital 
consultants and treatments. The ability of a patient-consumer to assess the quality of medical 
services received is for many types of treatment limited to such relatively peripheral issues as 
waiting time, comfort of waiting rooms and wards, and friendliness of staff, which they can 
use as a proxy for information to exercise choice. Contrary to policy makers’ assumptions, 
patients prefer to delegate clinical decisions to a knowledgeable and trusted medical 
professional, perhaps in order to not experience anxiety or regret (Ryan, 1994) as to whether 
they are taking the right decision especially in the case of life-threatening and complex 
procedures (Fotaki et al., 2008). Hence, choice seems to be valued much less by patients 
when compared with availability of good quality local services (Coulter, 2005). Overall, it 
seems that patients were not particularly interested in the choices policymakers wanted them 
to make and policymakers were not providing what mattered to patients.  
 
Furthermore, although individual patient choice policy was introduced to serve ‘the needs of 
many and not the articulate few’ (Milburn, 2003), it is not compatible with the goals of public 
health systems (Oliver & Evans, 2005) because not all groups of patients are able to exercise 
choice in an equal measure (Burge et al., 2005). Personalized choices are in conflict with the 
collective goals of public health systems (equity and efficiency) as more resources are likely 
to be needed to meet individualized patients’ wants at the expense of equal availability of 
services to all. The effects of the earlier pro-market reforms on improving efficiency were 
also questioned (Le Grand et al., 1998). More importantly, patients’ need for relational 
aspects of care (Mol, 2008), that do not easily fit with consumerist ethos of the market 
choice, is disregarded. 
Yet despite the evidence of a moderate success and relatively limited uptake of choice by 
patients, giving individual opportunities to decide about secondary aspects of services is 
popular with policy makers (author/s). This, we propose, is because choice is a concept 
susceptible to idealization as it evokes a fulfilling ideal of unlimited freedom; who, after all, 
can be against choice? However, it is the denial of limitations to choice and the inevitable 
trade-offs (between choice and equity and quality and efficiency for instance) that lies at the 
heart of idealization in patient choice policy. Idealization obscures the reality of such 
limitations and enables the creation of blind spots. The relatively low importance of choice 
for patients and the costs entailed in these reforms is side-stepped by projecting idealized 
expectations onto a specific policy which cannot be fulfilled. When expected effects go 
unrealized maintenance of the strategy may have to rely on the separation of the ‘good’ traits 
of the idealized policy, while insignificant shifts are proclaimed to be major breakthroughs 
(Pollock et al., 2011). Negative aspects of such policies are projected into external objects 
(i.e. incompetent managers, see Le Grand, 2003 or ‘unreformable’ and/or recalcitrant health 
professionals, see National Audit Office, 2005). Such splitting is a necessary mechanism for 
idealization to continue.  
 
However, it is not only policymakers who are blinded by policy idealization while those 
trying to make the reforms work face difficulty. Policies are also a product of social fantasy, 
expressing unconsciously held and collectively expressed longings (Fotaki, 2010:7):  
 
‘Because freedom of choice stands for (an illusory) freedom from the bounds of 
human predicament, the finitude of life and failure, it is an attractive proposition for 
the patients who can escape the reality of being ill and cared for, and for policy 
makers who can hope to make a lasting difference with a few additional resources’. 
One of the important tasks of public organizations is to encompass the unresolved (and often 
partially suppressed) value conflicts and moral ambivalence of society while the fate of the 
public official is to both express and contain it (Hoggett, 2006). In reality, many actors may 
be implicated in a dynamic that serves the unconscious needs of politicians and those of the 
public and users of services or even some professional groups, on whose behalf politicians 
work – and make policy. Since idealized expectations of choice cannot be realistically 
fulfilled through policy objectives, likely failure can easily unleash blaming of managers or 
clinicians and sometimes even extend to patients, as the final example illustrates. 
 
Example 3: Mental health service reform  
Mental health services have been subject to almost continuous reform since the introduction 
of community care and the closure of large asylums in the 1980s (Beresford et al., 2010). The 
idea of community-based mental health care is that people could be cared for at home except 
in exceptional circumstances. Following mass disinvestment in large institutions in England, 
the need remained for in-patient psychiatric beds which were often provided in small units on 
acute hospital sites.  
 
The case described here relates care provided in one of such settings, focusing on the on-
going difficulties experienced by those providing services on a psychiatric ward in one such 
acute hospital in the North West of England with few resources to do so. Although it presents 
details of one ward, the conditions described are not dissimilar to other psychiatric wards 
throughout England (Willshire, 1999). The ethnographic case study from which this example 
derives involved spending long periods on a psychiatric ward, observing and talking to staff 
and patients and trying to understand and interpret their experiences of organizational life. 
Fieldwork on the ward took place over six weeks and involved over 100 hours of non-
participant observation. In addition, staff and patients were interviewed. 
 
The psychiatric ward continuously operated at around 112% capacity, normally having 26 
severely mentally ill patients admitted to the ward and only 22 beds. The nursing staff had 
little control over who was admitted to the ward but had to find ways to accommodate new 
patients. They did so by sending patients home on leave in the hope that they could stay there 
until a bed became free again – their bed having been filled by an emergency admission. The 
physical and emotional demands of the work often threatened to overwhelm the staff as they 
were tasked with ensuring not only the well-being of the patients but the safety of the public 
at large by preventing harm from and to patients even when they were not on the ward.  
 
Social defences in a mental hospital can take the form of peculiar splitting whereby madness 
remains with the patients and sanity with the staff. Rigid barriers are then required to prevent 
contamination. These barriers can prevent the restoration of patients to a degree of health via 
their reclamation of sanity (Hinshelwood & Skogstad, 2000). In this instance, there was an 
additional aspect involving the idealization of reforms aiming to provide care in the 
community, which as was underpinned by the unconscious wish that this might contain 
and/or eradicate madness. The empirical vignette shows that there were no real means for 
offering adequate care for patients who had to be institutionalized even temporarily and those 
could not be provided for in the community.    
 
The ward environment was highly charged as the staff were working double-shifts, struggling 
to complete all tasks and finding themselves unable to meet the demands made of them. In 
addition, much of the equipment on the ward was broken and there were constant struggles to 
obtain even basic equipment such as functional telephones, televisions and kitchen 
equipment. These privations in psychiatric services are almost endemic and date back many 
years (Bott-Spillius, 1990). These demands were impossible to meet in two senses; first, there 
were not enough resources to care for the patients and second, there was no means of 
eliminating madness. To defend against the anxiety generated by the impossibility of the 
work there were many splits in the system; managers blamed staff for being inefficient, staff 
blamed patients for being overly demanding. This extract from the original case study gives 
one example: 
 
The unit manager was accommodated in a room adjacent to the ward but her 
description of the ward environment bore little resemblance to what I saw. She 
blamed the staff for the ward conditions. The staff blamed the patients for their 
constant requests to have doors unlocked or to gain access to parts of the ward such as 
the kitchen, bathrooms and activity room. One example of this misplaced blame 
concerned the ward milk supply. Each day 40 pints of milk were delivered for 22 
patients. The majority of this milk was removed by other people whom the ward staff 
let onto the ward – cleaners, builders etc. However, the constant shortage of milk was 
attributed to the patients who were described by staff as ‘greedy’, ‘selfish’ and 
‘demanding’. To compensate for the constant shortage of milk a relative brought in a 
four pint container of milk for her son. When the relative approached a nurse to ask 
where the milk had gone to, the nurse replied; ‘It will have been drunk by the others’. 
A nurse says very quietly ‘it’s in the OT kitchen’. Eventually the keys are found and 
the milk is obtained. (Case study analysis) 
 
Blame was displaced from one person to another with staff taking their frustration out on the 
patients, for example by thwarting the accomplishment of simple tasks such as washing or 
cooking. These events could result in patients either becoming aggressive or protesting by 
refusing to cooperate with staff. Either way, the patient ran the risk of being forcibly 
restrained and isolated and, for a moment, enabling the staff to feel effective in their ways of 
coping with the impossible work tasks. Patients had to deal with considerable frustrations and 
to accept their diagnosis on pain of forced treatment, restraint or isolation. Thus good patients 
“toed the line”, were able to suppress their frustration and contain emotional reactions and 
were encouraged to be passive by waiting for long periods for their needs to be met. The staff 
aspired to provide care and good treatment, however, much of their work actually involved 
physical control and containment. This extract from the field notes describes one incident 
where Winston, one of the patients, was blamed for having eaten all the cakes: 
 
I wandered in and sat down to see what lunch was like. There were packs of 
sandwiches thrown on a serving shelf. Normally, the patients had to get them out of a 
bin liner but today they had been taken out of the bin liner they came in because [the 
nurse] used it to take the lunchtime cakes away. She did this, she said, “because 
Winston had them all yesterday”. In fact, he had served them to patients and staff. 
Today, he was in the dining room and she was humiliating him by saying this loudly 
in front of other patients. (Field notes, Week 1, day 4) 
 
Blame was attributed around the system as patients were held responsible for poor treatment 
results, staff blamed for the poor quality of care, managers blamed for poor service facilities 
and, ultimately, policy makers blamed for poorly conceived and funded policy (author/s). 
However, there was an overall commitment to a failing mental health policy. Demands on 
staff escalated and the organization remained blinded to the unworkability of such idealized 
policies and the emerging problems.  
 
Willshire (1999) suggests that managing mental health services is particularly problematic 
because the work itself (managing mental health) involves importing madness into the system 
and then attempting to impose rational work structures to deal with it. She also notes the 
tendency to search for ideal institutions, treatments or solutions that will eradicate madness. 
However, the idealized state could not be realistically achieved. In this instance in-patient 
services, whilst relocated, changed very little from asylum care (Willshire, 1999). Blind spots 
must therefore become institutionalized in the system because the system itself depends on 
them since they are concerned with the difficulty and ultimately the inability to distinguish 
between the roles of reformed institution and the asylum. Defences available from 
bureaucratic structures in both systems enabled staff to protect themselves from contact and 
contamination by note writing, ordering supplies or structured contacts with patients that 
avoided emotional connections (Bain, 1998), which was not dissimilar to Menzies’s 
observations from more than forty years ago. 
 
Organizational blind spots: Towards an alternative understanding of escalation of 
commitment  
The three vignettes from the NHS health services in England illustrate why and how certain 
organizations develop blind spots, which prevent them from acknowledging the sources of 
their difficulties thus leaving them more likely to commit to failing strategies.  
 
Sleesman et al’s, (2012) meta-analysis of research conducted over the last 35 years noted key 
project and psychological determinants of escalation of commitment. However the authors 
also argued that research has yet to take account of structural and social factors indicated in 
this study (Sleesman et al., 2012). This article goes some way towards addressing this gap. It 
elucidates the systemic mechanisms that cause organizations to commit to failing strategies, 
which may seem irrational but which express the unconscious needs and demands of their 
members and their potential clients as well. Although it speaks to the literature on the 
escalation of commitment, the paper is more concerned with the persistence of escalation of 
commitment and specifically its social embeddedness rather than simply with its emergence. 
This, we suggest, can be best understood by drawing on the body of theory that places 
unconscious affective dynamics at its center.  
 
The first contribution emerging from the psychodynamic conception of blind spots is the 
conception of escalation of commitment as an affective process connecting organizational, 
systemic and individual levels. Unlike previous affective explanations for escalation of 
commitment, it introduces a view of failure that goes beyond tangible losses and threats to 
self-esteem, to explain that the loss that must be averted is the loss of an idealized image of 
the organization and the affect management function that such images serve. In other words, 
the escalation is socially embedded, but there is more at stake than an impression 
management dynamic as suggested by extant literature (see for instance Brazerman & Neal, 
1992; Wong & Kwong, 2007). Escalation of commitment then can seem to be about the 
maintenance of an ‘ideal’ on behalf of others as well as the self, through unconscious 
affective dynamics.  
 
An important implication of our contribution therefore concerns the inability of power 
holders and/or policy makers to recognize the origins of blind spots in overly ambitious 
policies, as well as their own emotional investment in these policies. The size of problems 
like managing madness and the prestige associated with grand projects such as the National 
Program for IT, play a crucial role in blinding key power holders such as senior management 
and/or policy makers by creating enormous pressure to demonstrate success, often fed by 
public scrutiny. This pressure and the attendant riskiness of the endeavors can trigger a 
reversion to unconscious mechanisms for affect management which can propagate throughout 
the social system. Thus, in contrast to cognitive approaches which assume that more 
deliberate forms of affect management are involved in the escalation of commitment, we 
offer a view in which affect plays a crucial role but is much less subject to conscious 
recognition and control. Such intensification of commitment to a chosen course of action, 
driven by a desire to avoid humiliation associated with failure (Staw & Fox, 1979), may lead 
to greater and greater material losses.  
 
The second contribution we make concerns the exact mechanisms through which blind spots 
develop, as elaborated with our three examples from the NHS in England. These examples 
illustrate how susceptibility to blind spots can occur when idealized projects are proposed, 
which cannot be realistically implemented within the given timeframe, resources available, or 
without reconciling the needs and demands of all relevant stakeholders. The creation of blind 
spots occurs when the capacity to integrate reality has been undermined via excessive 
idealization. Idealization of one’s own actions and the values associated with specific projects 
supports pervasive denial of undesirable realities at an institutional level. It is therefore both a 
concomitant and a necessary defensive reaction that offers comfort and enables disconnection 
from difficult emotions when desirable outcomes fail to materialize.  
 
Maintaining a policy as an idealized ‘good object’ under such circumstances may require a 
psychological splitting off of any evidence of failure in which undesirable elements of 
organizational reality are projected into ‘bad’ objects in order to shield strategists from 
contact with operational difficulties. Splitting and shifting the blame for any potential failures 
away from the self, which is the next step in establishing blind spots throughout the 
organization, are indispensable for maintaining the fantasy that desirable policies and 
organizational objectives can materialize if inconvenient aspects of reality are avoided. 
Splitting can then develop as a socially sanctioned defence against anxiety, and ultimately 
become enacted in physical divisions between parts of the system or organization, as was 
seen in each of our three examples. Specifically, the first (IT) example illustrated how 
splitting between policy designers and implementers could lead to the downfall and eventual 
abandonment of a large-scale project. In the second example of individualized patient choice, 
splitting between patients and health care providers allowed for the possibility of attaining 
policy goals to go unchallenged. The final example we presented illustrated how blame for 
the inadequacies of de-institutionalization policies was transferred (via the staff) to the 
patients themselves. However, blaming distorts reality and is a substitute for meaningful 
action to resolve problems. Blame is also counterproductive, as it is not about learning from 
experience but simply provides temporary relief from undesirable and overpowering feelings 
of failure, as shown in the mental health example. 
 
Our third and final contribution is to highlight the influence of higher level social dynamics 
on the individual psychology that enables escalation of commitment. The proposed theory of 
the development and institutionalization of blind spots elucidates the dynamics that lead to 
their formation and originate in unrealistic policies expressing unconscious demands of 
policy makers and their constituencies at the system level. Thus if we consider that these 
unrealistic policies are put in place on behalf of a broader social desire for organizations to 
neatly address large and intractable problems then the defence mechanisms of idealization, 
splitting and blame that organizations deploy do not merely ‘allow’ them to continue to 
remain committed to unworkable strategies: in fact, the unworkable policies ‘demand’ that 
organizations remain committed to those strategies. This explains their persistence which 
often makes the escalation of commitment inevitable. Put differently, because social defences 
are often inbuilt in public policies, the intensification of commitment becomes 
institutionalized by the development of organizational blind spots as areas of reality distortion 
and avoidance, which prevent realistic evaluation of organizational performance.  
 
The concept of organizational blind spots we advance explains escalation of commitment 
from a novel perspective. That is, it links systemic and individual levels and shows how the 
intensification of defensive mechanisms is constantly required to, at least temporarily, avert 
acknowledgement of loss or failure. As shown in our examples, this is often achieved by 
cutting off decision makers and various parts of the organization tasked with the 
implementation of complex and important projects from the source of potential distress. 
When this happens, there may be insufficient consideration of important sources of difficulty. 
Importantly, the aspirations that policies come to express often go relatively unchallenged as 
they fulfill societal desires of the public and organizational members alike to believe in the 
idealized organization. Although the concept of ‘blind spots’ may imply a concern with long-
term organizational functionality, we wish also to draw attention to the ‘disowned 
subjectivity’ by citizens who project their aspirations onto public institutions (Hoggett, 2006). 
Policy goals are often ambiguous and sometimes also contradictory, because public 
organizations serve as ‘a receptacle for containing social anxieties’ (Hoggett, 2006:177). 
Such links to the systemic level, and the consideration given to affective attachments by 
which societal aspirations find their way to policies and strategies, eventually becoming 
internalized and enacted by individuals and groups in organizations, represent a major 
contribution to the original theory of socially sanctioned defences against anxiety that was 
proposed by Menzies and Jacques.    
 
In sum, we contribute by proposing an innovative approach to understanding dysfunctions of 
policy implementation in public organizations. Our theoretical stance is consistent with 
emergent psychosocial approaches to studying policy environments and the organizations 
implementing them. To date, policy research has offered limited accounts of why unrealistic 
projects occur in the public sphere even though persistent commitment is not uncommon in 
public policy (see Dickinson & Sullivan, 2013; Fotaki, 2010; Gunder, 2010). We highlight 
the role of defences against anxiety, which are unconsciously held, deeply engrained and 
maladaptive, in the development of blind spots. The three NHS examples suggest to us that 
the capacity for splitting and idealization is particularly facilitated when institutions such as 
governments take responsibility for health care, allowing individuals to escape anxiety about 
their own unconscious fears related to infirmity and mortality. Health care organizations are 
especially prone to idealization as they set out to save lives and reduce suffering, but 
realistically cannot fully achieve their ideal.  
 
Conclusions 
Whilst the difficulties of policy implementation have long been recognized, we explain how 
separation between policy formation and implementation enables policy makers to become 
unrealistic and idealistic while operational staff are neither able to implement these 
unrealistic policies nor to have their difficulties heard. The process of articulating impossible 
policies and the difficulties involved in implementing them are all underscored by social 
defences around working in health care (Fotaki, 2010). This, we have suggested, leads to 
multiple affective investments and responses in organizations, which are generated by both, 
the reality of implementing of unrealistic policy, and the recognition that such policies are 
doomed to fail. Yet while we must remain aware of the various psychological functions that 
public organizations play for wider society, we suggest organizations in the larger 
commercial sector are not immune to the processes we have described as they conceive of 
themselves existing for the social good. 
 
We have proposed an alternative explanation as to why organizational strategies may so 
easily become divorced from organizational practice having a detrimental effect on 
organizational functioning and performance that is a result of the escalation of commitment 
to failing courses of action. In exploring three health service examples taken from the NHS in 
England, we have demonstrated why and how splitting in the system (mostly between policy 
and its implementation) enables idealization of the task and its turning it into an aspirational 
grand project causing organizations to abandon the task they have been created to fulfill. 
Examples of splitting and blame underpinning such dynamics have been outlined to illustrate 
how these processes are self-defeating as they do not enable critical review of organizational 
difficulties; while they may offer temporary relief problems remain unsolved and the 
organization must work all the harder to sustain these splits leading to the creation of blind 
spots.  
 
One final point concerning the concept of blind spots we propose is about its distinctiveness 
from complex cases of ‘perverse blindness’ that Long (2007) has theorized by examining 
business and commercial institutions. Drawing on a different organizational example from 
mental health care services, Rizq (2013) supports her argument by demonstrating how the 
NHS ‘market for care’ turns a blind eye to the emotional realities of suffering, particularly in 
mental health services as one of our vignettes has shown. The ‘virtual reality’ where attention 
to targets, outcomes, protocols and policies is privileged over attention to the patient's 
psychological needs has led to the perversion of care. This raises important questions about 
conditions enabling policy makers to blind themselves to the predictable effects of their own 
actions. This issue, and the enabling role of their constituencies in making such outcomes 
possible, could be a subject of the future psychosocial research agenda on public policy 
outcomes in diverse organizational settings other than the health care examples discussed 
here.    
 
Counteracting blind spots generated by idealization, splitting and blame in organizations is 
both possible and desirable. But how might they be overcome? In therapeutic terms, 
recognition of unconscious processes can start a journey towards realism, although this 
carries the cost of giving up idealized objects. Certain factors encourage re-integration. As in 
psychotherapy, where the bringing to consciousness of previously unconscious material 
allows for reconciliation and changed behaviors, organizations can become aware of 
counterproductive forces and actions. The three examples clearly show that certain groups 
within the organizations (e.g. clinicians or patients) are often painfully aware of the 
difficulties. However, when their voices are cordoned off through splitting and blame, their 
input may not be heard or acted upon. Moreover our examples show that when policies fail to 
deliver, the blame is, often mistakenly, shifted onto different parts of the organization, groups 
of operational workers or external bodies. Only when something like the Challenger disaster 
occurs do we suddenly realize with painful clarity the interdependencies and links between 
the persons on whom we project heroic properties and the management and administration 
that serves them (Krantz & Gilmore, 1990). A more desirable, integrative response by top 
decision makers is to recognize warnings as unwelcome news but an inescapable aspect of 
reality, rather than solely a sole source of anxiety. Tendencies towards using social defences 
to maintain collective self-esteem can possibly be overcome through reflexive questioning in 
the process of organizational learning (Brown & Starkey, 2000). Understanding how 
splitting, idealization and blame operate in organizational systems can aid their understanding 
and acceptance. Increased awareness of maladaptive defences that impede effective operation 
might enable re-integration of crucial sources of necessary but unpleasant information in 
organizational practices. Rather than offering predictive tools, psychodynamic techniques 
presented here, allow for appreciation of these aspects of organizational realities and 
elucidation of the work of social defences on a systemic level. By unearthing these dynamics, 
we hope this article encourages reflexive questioning of blind spots and how they may 
contribute to the escalation of commitment to failed causes. 
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